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RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR TO MAKE TRANSPERS.
Under the system in Bngland by Dig. Adm. (B. 4), Yeomans v.
which the goods of a decedent were Bradshaw, Carth., 373; 3 Salk., 70;
administered in virtue of letters of
probate or ofadministration granted
by the ordinary, or by way of
special prerogative from the metropolitan of the province, as the existence of bona notabiliain one or
more jurisdictions made necessary
(2 1l. CoM., 508, 509), little difficulty arose concerning the locality
of personal property, such as household goods and movable chattels.
But where the property consisted
of choses in action, 'numerous disputes between the ordinaries made
it necessaryto establish for them
some distinct sius: Att.-Gen. v.
Bonwens, 4 M.- & W., 171, 191.
Specialty debts were iccordingly
held to belong to the jurisdiction
where the specialties were found:
Att.-Gen. v. Bouwens, 4 M. & W.,
171, 191, Coin. Dig. Administrator
(B. 4), and simple contract debts
where the debtor resided: Com.

Pipon v. Pipon, Anab., 26.
Considering the question, however, as between State and State,
instead of between different, ordinaries jurisdictions, since no country
can give its laws any extra-territorial force, it is easy to perceive
the logic of reasoning that, debtors
can only be compelled to liquidate
their debts in the country where the
debtormay be found and the authority of the personal representative is
also recognized: Story's Conft. of

Laws,

512.

On the same principle and in
the same light specialty debts are
not recognized by the law of England as always assets wherever
found, but the s'us of such debts
at any particular time likewise depends on the ability of the admiiistrator at such time to sue -the
debtor within his jurisdiction:
Wharton's Confi. of Laws, 1 615;

I Reported in 17 S. W. Rep., xo5o.
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Huthwaite v. Phaire, i M. & G., against, the drawer, by virtue of
letters granted under the autliority
I$9. The early case of -Daniel v.
Luker (1571) Dyer, 305, is not in- of the Bishop of Durham. Upon
cojnsistent with such a view. The
demurrer it was. argued that, as
defendant, a native of Ireland, in a
trover would lie for the conversion
suitin England by an English ad- ,f such a bill it must therffore be
ministrator, on a bond which had
"goodsand chattels" andalould be
never been out of England, pleaded considered bona notabliawherever
a release by the Irish administrator.
found, but Lord HOLT said, it
While the decision presumptiyely
was no more than a simple conwent on the ground that, the bond
tract, which followed the debtor,
was an asset where it was found, yet
and likened it. unto an award in
the case can also be broughtwithin
writing. (Cited with approval by
the principle that the situs of the
Baron PARKE in Mondel v. Steele,
debt is that of .the debtor. In
i Dowl. Rep. (N. S.) 155; also'in.:'
Whyte v. Rose (1842), 3 Q. B., 493,
Wyman v. Hglstead, lo9 U. S., 656;
an action was brought in England
Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich.
by the English administrator of an
See also Ingraham's Went.
568.
intestate dying in Ireland on a
Exrs.. 96; Atty.-Gen. v. Bouwens
deed which was in Ireland at the
(1838) 4M. &W., 171, 191; Rand v.
time. of his death, and it was con- Hubbard, 4 Met., 252).
tended that an Irish administrator
On an information for, probate
alone could sue, but the Court of
duty, it appeared that, a resident of'
Queen's Bench, speaking through
Indiahaving directed certain securTINDALL, C. J., held the English
ities to be realjzed and the proceeds
grant of administration to be suffitransmitted, to his bankers in Engcient. Mr. FOOTE .(Foote's Int. land, died while the proceeds of the
Jus., 2d ed., 279), having stated-the
sale, consisting of bills of exchange
facts of these two cases, says: " It
payable in six months after sight,
is difficult -to regard the situs of
drawn by a bank in India on a bank
such a bond as the' real locality of
in London in favor of his bankers,
the assets represented by it, in pref- were on their way to England. The
erence to* the country where the bills having been duly honored
debtormust be sued.". "A contract
and the money received by the dein one place makes a man a debtor
fendant, the question was, whether
in every place." .Peacock v. Bell,
the amount of the bills was subject
i Win. Saund. 73.
to the duty. KELLIZ, C. B., in deWhile as between the ordinaries
livering his opinion, after stating
in England specialty debts were
that, he considered bills ofexchange
given the chattel-like quality of
of the nature of personal chattels;
being assets wherever found, the
because trover could be maintained
rule did not extend to the case of
for them, said, "secondly, on the
bills of exchange and promissory
ground which has -been chiefly adnotes. In Yeomans v. Bradshaw
verted to by my learned brothers, I
(1728), Carth., 373; 3 Salk., 70,
am clear that the bills, or rather the
the point was directly in issue.
money, property, or debt repreThe administratrix of a deceased
sented by them are liable for propayee of ha bill of exchange
bate duty, namely, on the ground
that where assets consist of debts,
brought an action in London
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they are assets where the debtor resides. There may, at first sight,
seem to be some difficulty in applying this principle to the case, because at the time of probate no debt
was due from any one. The drawer
wouldonlybe undera liability in the
event of the bill being dishonored,
the drawee was under no liability;
because he had not yet accepted the
bill; there was therefore no actual
debtor in existence. We are, therefore, driven to see who in fact became the debtor and provided and
paid the money. Now the bills
were presented for acceptance in
due time; they were accepted and
paid at maturity, the only persons,
therefore, whoever became debtors
were the acceptors. They were
residents of London, and the money
came to hand in London; the assets
were therefore in London." AmPLETr, B., remarked: "Here the
assets are represented by bills of
exchange, which were then on their
passage from India to England, but
when the nature of a bill of exchange is considered, it will appear
that they represent, but do not constitute the assets. The testator had
ordered his agent to pay money to
a bank in London. If this order
had not been complied with, the
testator would have had recourse to
the drawer. But if it was complied
with, and if either money or credit,
which is represented by the bills of
exchange was in London, then the
assets were in London. If it had
been otherwise, then the assets
would have been in India:" Att.Gen. z'. Pratt (1872), L. R., 9 Ex.,
140.
In the earlier case of Att.- Gen.
v. Bouwens (1838), 4 M. & XV., 171,
192, a bill of exchange payable out
of England was considered an instrument of chattel nature capable

of being transferred in England by
the English administrator. The
authority on which Lord ABINGER
supports his opinion(PARKE,doubtless concurred), appears to be 517
of Story's "Conflict of Laws." (See
Westlake's Priv. Int. Law,
88.)
Adopting also 516 to more clearly
express the idea, it is there written:
"If a foreign administrator has, in
virtue of his administration, reduced the personal property of the
deceased, there situated, into his
own possession, so that he has acqftired the legal title thereto according to the laws of that country,
if that property should afterwards
be found in another country, or be
carried away or converted there
against his will, he may maintain
suit for it there in his own name
and right personally, without taking out new letters of administralion; for he is, to all intents and
purposes, the legal owner thereof,
although he is so in the character
of trustee for other persons. The
plain reason of such case is, that
the executor has, in his own right,
become full and perfect owner of
the property by the local law: and
a title to personal property duly
acquired by the lex loci rei sita,
will be deemed valid and will be
respected as a lawful and perfect
title in every other country. The
like principle will apply where
an executor or administrator, in
virtue of an administration abroad,
becomes there possessed of negotiable notes belonging to the deceased which are payable to bearer;
for then he becomes the legal owner
and bearer by virtue of his administration and may sue thereon in
hisown name; and he need not take
out letters of administration in the
State where the debtor resides, in
order to maintain suit against him.
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And for a like reason it would seem
that negotiable paper of the deceased payable to order, actually
held and endorsed by a foreign executor or administrator in the foreign country, who is capable there
of passing the legal title by such
endorsement, would confer a complete legal title on the endorsee, so
that he ought to be treated in every
other country as the legal endorsee,
and allowed to sue thereon accordingly in the same manner that he
would be if it were a transfer of
any personal goods or merchandise
of the deceased, situated in such foreign country."
"The maxim of the law of the
civilized world is, "mobilia sequen_
hmrpersonam," and is founded on
the nature of things. When mobilia are in places other than that
of the person to whom they belong,
their accidental situs is disregarded,
and they are held to go along with
the person." (Lord SELBOURNE in
Freke v. Lord Carbery, L. R., i6
Eq., 466; Foote's Int. Jus., 2d ed.,
224; Story's Confl. of Laws, P 380.)
But, in the words of Judge BUTLER
(Carmichael v. Ray, i Rich. II6),
"it is a mistake to suppose that,
upon his death, his legal representatives, appointed under the laws of
his domicile, are invested with like
title and power as to all such property; while the owner when alive
is, clothed with this authority, yet
his death is an event which changes
the character of the title, and invests new parties with power over
his estate:" Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573.
No nation is under any obligation to enforce foreign laws to the
prejudice of the rights of its subjects. It has been well said "the
duty of every government is to pro tect its own citizens, and especially

the rights of creditors as the
material and commercial prosperity
of a country depends greatly on
this protection and security. If a
government fails in this, it fails in
one of its most impoftant functions.
and duties. To this end, therefore,
it is well understood that the different governments in which the
movable property of a deceased
may be left, upon his death, are
authorized to intervene and take
control.
Hence, in every State,
we find laws declaring in whom
such property, within its limits,
shall vest, and in what manner it
shall be administered: " SIMPSON,
C. J., in Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573. The title of an executor or
administrator, derived from a grant
of administration, cannot de jure,
as a matter of right, extend beyond
the territory of the government
which grants it. The title acknowledged in another is acknowledged
from comity. Reason is against
extending the comity.
"It would
be a'great hardship upon the
creditors of a decedent in any
country to allow a foreign administrator to withdraw the assets
of his estate without the payment
of their claims, and leave there to
seek their remedy in a foreign
jurisdiction, and, perhaps, then to
meet, with obstructions and inequalities in the enforcement of
their rights from the peculiarities
of the local law:" Story's Confl. of
Laws,
512. This policy grows
more important with the possibility
of the decedent being insolvent,
because the lex fort determines
the priority ofclaims: Story's Confl.
of Laws, a 524 and 525; Wharton's
Confl. of Laws,
622. Agreeably
to these considerations it has been
the general rule that, neither an
executor or administrator may
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maintain a suit in a foreign coun- name." This was but a re-statetry, unless he has obtained a new ment of the law, established in the
grant of administration, or has same court in Harper v. Butler
qualified as required by the local (1829), 2 Pet., 239. An executor
laws: Story's Confl. of Laws, 512.
assigned a note which was payable
Where the 'property is "movto the deceased absolutely, without
able, tangible property, such as any negotiable words. It was dehorses, cattle, wares and merchan- cided that the debtor might be sued
dise, the foreign administrator can- in another State, if, by the law
not sue for their recovery from where the assignment was made,
want of title. The same want of the legal title passed, and by the
- title prevents any recognition of law of the forum, the assignee
his transferee:" Dial v. Gary, 14 S. could sue in his own name.
C., 573.
This was the first case in which
But it-has been said that "an
such a doctrine was promulgated.
,assignment by an administrator of No counsel appeared for the defena chose in action in the State dant, no authorities were cited by
where he is appointed, and which counsel or the court, and the
is good by its laws, will enable the opinion is very meagre. Andrews
assignee to sue in his own name in v. Carr (1853), 26 Miss., 579, and
any other State, by whose laws the Owen v. Moody (1855), 29 Miss.,
instrument would be assignable, so 79, follow the same principle upon
'as to pass title to the assignee, and a like form of contract, but the
enablex him to sue thereon:"
former is as unsatisfactory as HarStory's Confl. of -Laws,
359. per v. Butler.
Trecothick v. Austin, 4 Mason, 16
Leake v. Gilchist (1829), 2 Dev.
(opinion by Story), was cited as kN. C.), 73, went broadly on the
being founded on this doctrine, although it is no authority for such a
proposition. There are cases, however, in the United States which do
maintain such a rule. In Wil-

kins v. Fllet (1882), io8 U. S., 256,
Mr. Justice GRAY said: "The administrator, by virtue of his appointment and authority as such,
obtains the title to promissory
notes and other written evidences

of debt, held by the intestate at
the time olhis death, and coming to
the possession of the administrator,
and may selltransfer and endorse

the same; and the purchasers may
maintain actions

in their

own

names against the debtors in another State, if the notes are negotiable promissory notes, or if by the
law of the State, the assignee of a

chose in action may sue in his own

ground that debts due by specialty
are assets for administration wherever the specialty is found. In admitting the right of the assignee of
a foreign administrator to sue, it
was remarked that, the evil of permitting a withdrawal of the assets
out of the State to the inconvenien ce
of creditors, could only arise in
this class of debts, and could not
be alarming; because they formed
usually but a small portion of the
assets of an estate. Grace v. Hannah (1858), 6 Jones' Law, 94, and
Smith v. Tiffany, 16 Hun., 552, are
parallel decisions.
A chose in action, by its very
name, signifies a thing or property
of which the owner has not the
possession, but merely a right of
action for its possession: 2 BI.
Com., 389; Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
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573. The idea contains two elements, the property itself and the
right to obtain possession of the
property.
An instrument which
shows the title'in the owner, is but
a representative or shadow. This
evidence of the property may be
in one jurisdiction; the property in
another: Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573The English law, as between
country and country, recognizes
the distinction: Whyte v. Rose
(1842), 3 Q. B., 493; Wharton's
Confl. of Laws, 615; Foote's Int.
Jus., 2d ed., 279. An American
case also accords with this view.
The question was, whether the
plaintiff, a holder of a bond, purchased by him from a foreign
domicilliary administrator, had the
legal right to sue the debtor in
South Carolina: "S I M P soN, C. J.,
in delivering the opinion of the
Court, said: The chose or thing is
situated in South Carolina, and the
evidence of right to sue, at the
death of the intestate, was in Massachusetts, but that right could not
have been exercised in that State
even by the owner of the bond himself, at leht, so long as the debtor
continued in South Carolina, and
according to strict law, ought to be
subject to administration in South
Carolina: Dial v. Gary (i88o), 14
S. C., 573.
In Peterson v. The Chemical
Bank (1865), 32 N. Y., 21, the
point was as to the right of a
foreign executor to assign a debt,
due by the defendant bank to his
testator, and evidenced by a bank
book. The contract was so drawn
as to indemnify the assignee of the
fund for any expenses incurred in
its collection, the design being to
avoid the founding of an administion in the State where the bank

rNUE.s
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was situated. DnNio, C. J., lfho
delivered the opinion, considered
the disibility of the foreign executor
to sue, as attaching to his person
and not to the subject matter of the
action, and sustained the suit.
The effect of the instrument depends on the attitude of the sovereignty in which the property is
situated. Because an instrument is
negotiable in both the:country of
the contract and the country of the
forum, and in the country of the
forum the assignee of a "lawful
man " (Pollock on Contracts, 49),
is entitled to sue in his own name,
it doesenot follow that an administrator may transfer an enforceable
title: See Yeomans v. Bradshaw,
Carth., 373; Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C.,
573; Thompson V. Wilson, 2 N. H.,
291; McCarthy v. Hall, 13 Mo.,
480; Slocum v. Sanford, 2 Conn.,
533; SHIRWOOD, J., in Reynolds
v. McMullen, 55 Mich., 568;
Stearns v. Burnham, 5 Greenl.
(Me.), 261. To maintain such a
doctrine would "defeat the great
object of each State or government
retaining control over the property
of an absent decedent, the rights
of domestic creditors might be
wholly destroyed, and the laws
providing local administration
under local authorities for the protection of such creditors eluded
and overthrown :" SIMPSON, C. J.,
in Dial v. Gary, 14 S. C., 573;
SHERWOOD, J., in Reynolds v. McMvullen, 55 Mich., 568; Steams v.
Burnham, 5 Greenl. (Me.), 261.
The transferee would be given a
greater right than he from whom
title was obtained. The principle
of law that, a person by an execution of a power, may often confer
an enforceable title where he himself could not have sued (see Rand
v. Hubbard, 4 Met.), does not apply:

-
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Dial v. Gary, i4 S. C., 573. A personal representative is of an artificial status peculiar to himself,
which can neither be compared to
the status of infants, married
women, lunatics, corporations or
assignees in bankruptcy: (As to assignees in bankruptcy, see Goodwin
v. Jones, 3 Mass., 517.) No distinction between executors and administrators can be made. That fanciful idea must be fully adlswered by
the inability of a government to
give its grant of letters testamentary any extra-territorial effect:
Story's Confl. of Laws, ? 512.
'These considerations would exclude all contracts of an administrator for the transfer of assets of
the estate not reduced to possession
'and in a foreign jurisdiction. Nor
do the decisions limit the extent of
their application. But due regard
'to the peculiar character internationally conceded to promissory
notes and bills of exchange 3ayable to order or bearer, makes an
examination of their practical operation desirable. According to the
Lex Mercatoria adopted by England, "the absolute benefit of the
contract is attached to the ownership
of such instruments, which according to the ordinary rules would be
only evidence of the contract.
The proof of ownership is then
facilitated by prescribing a mode
of transfer which makes the instrument itself an authentic record of
the successive transfers. Finally,
this proof is dispensed with by presuming the bona fide possessor ot
the instrument to be the true owner" (Pollock on Contracts, 17).
The English case cited by Story
in 517 of "Conflict of Laws," to
support his theory of a personal
representative being capable of
giving an assignee of such instru-

ments an enforcible title against
a foreign debtor, is McNeilage v.
Holloway (818). I B. &. A., 218,
deciding that a husband is entitled
to sue alone on a bill of exchange
given to his wife before marriage,
an analogy being drawn between
such instruments and personal
chattels. But another and later
English case also cited, Richards
v. Richards (1831), 2 B. & Ad., 447,
does not maintain the chattel-like
quality. The American authorities relied on by Story are Robinson v. Crandell" (1832), 9 Wend.,
425, and Barrett v. Barrett (1832),
Greenl. (Me.), 353. In Barrett v.
Barrett an administrator in New
Hampshire sued in his own name
on a note drawn in favor of his
intestate and endorsed by him in
blank. The jury found substantially, the suit to have been
brought for the benefit of the
estate. But the Court considered
the question as one for the application of the ordinary rules governing such notes, and the circumstance of the plaintiff really being
a trustee, a fact which could not
affect the liability of the defendant.
And it was said, if any matter of
off-set existed againstthe estate it
might be availed of in defence of
the action, on the theory that the
plaintiff took with notice of such
equities.
In the New York case of Robinson v. Crandell, decided in the
same year, SUTHERLAND, J., said:
"The notes being payable to bearer
and the payee having died in Pennsylvania, admitting the plaintiffs
to have been his administrators
there, and in that manner to have
obtained possession of the notes, I
see no legal objection to their maintaining an action upon them in
their own names as bearers. As
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administrators they could not sue
here. Letters testamentary or of
administration granted abroad give
no authority to sue here; we take
no notice of them. " But being the
real owners of the note they had a
right to declare as bearers and recover in that character. A mere
agent having a note of his principal, payable to bearer, may sue on
it in his own name, and it does
not lie with the defendant to object
to the plaintiff's want of interest."
The benefit of the exception of
promissory notes overcoming the
rule that on a decedent's death
debts acquire the situs of the debtor,
together with the policy which such
a rule embodies seems, therefore
to be reasoned on the doctrine that
in a suit on a note payable to bearer,
suing for the advantage of another
does not alter the principle of
liability.
Before discussing whether any
other than Story's idea is practicable, the other cases bearing on the
question in the United States will
be considered.
Robinson v. Crandell and Story's
. 517, "Conflict of Laws," as applied to notes and bills payable to
bearer are sustained by Knapp v.
Lee (1879), 42 Mich., 41; Sandford
v. McCreedy (1871), 28 Wis., 1O3;
615.
Wharton's "Confl. of Iaws," ?.
In Campbell v. Brown (1884), 64
Iowa, 425, the endorsement was
from the executor to a third person, who was legatee of the notes
under a will. And Giddings v.
Green (I88o), 4 Hughes, C. Ct., 446,
permitted foreign executors to sue
as such and to subject a piece of
land to the lien of purchase money.
This last case is certainly much
broader than Story's idea of the
law, and no other authority can be
found where the character of an
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instrument which was the property
of the decedent altered the disability of the foreign administrator
to sue: See ?,512, Story's "Conft.
of Laws.
Where an administrator has actual possession of a note or bill pa)able to order, Story maintains the
chattel nature of the instrument
should permit him to invest his
transferee with an absolute title:
Confl. of Laws, ?.517; see also
Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met., 14; Goodett v. Anderson (i88I), 7 'Lea
(Tenn.), 286; St. John v. Hodges,
9 Bar. (Tenn.), 334.
Thompson v. Wilson (1820), 2
N. H., 291, recognized and applied
the opposite rule. Debts due on
simple contract were said to be
bona notabilia where the debtor
lived, and consequently the foreign
executor had no interest to assign.
The same idea was more clearly
expressed in Stearns v. Burnham,
5 Greenl. (Me.), 261: "The power
of this executrix, by law, is to administer all the goods, chattels,
rights and credits which are within
Massachusetts. Debts due to the
testator, at the time of his death,
from persons residing in other
States, are placed by law on the
same grounds as goods and chattels
belonging to him and being in another State. Once there she, as
executrix, deriving her authority
under the laws of Massachusetts,
has no control. We are then led
to inquire how an executor or administrator, acting under the authority derived from another State,
can, by indorsing a note due from
one of our citizens, give to his endorsee a power which he himself
does not possess; that is, of successfully suing and recovering in our
courts. If this can be done it will
be an indirect mode of giving op-
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eration,.in this State, to the laws of
Massachusetts, as such: or in other
words, authority derived directly
from her laws, which are not in
force in this State. By adopting
such a principle, the effects or
credits of a testator or intestate
found in this State might be withdrawn, which may be necessary for
satisfying debts due from such testator or intestate to citizens of this
State."
In McCarthy v. Hall, (i85o) 13
Mo., 48o, RV1,AND, J., added,"Were
our courts to permit the executors
or administrators of a foreign State
to sue or maintain actions on notes
and bonds due to their testators or
intestates by the citizens of our
State,'or to permit their assignees
to sue, all the effects, goods and
chattels, of such testators or intestAtes might thereby easily be withdrawfi from our jurisdiction to the
prejudice and injury of our citizens.
•. Such is never suffered orpermitted.
It i s our duty to guard the interest
of our own citizens, to look well to
our own household first. Nostrum
jus, magis quam jus alienum, servemus.1"
So in Connecticut, where suit
was brought by an administrator on
a note payable to the intestate or
order, a payment to the ancillary
administrator at the domicile of the
debtor was held a discharge as
against a subsequent suit by the
principal administrator who held
the note: Slocum v. Sandford, 2
Conn., 534. See also the opinion
of SHERWOOD, T., in Reynolds v.
- McMullen, 55 Mich., 568.
Gove v. Gove, 64 N. H., 503, however overruled the principles stated
in Thompson v.Wilson, 2 N. H., 291,
and Barrett v. Barrett, 8 Greenl. 346,
makes no mention of Stearns v.
Burnham, 5 Greenl., 26r, although
upon an almost similar point.

Riddick v.'Moore (1871), 65 N.
C., 382, presents a phase of this
question.
The administrator in
Virginia sent a note to an agent in
North Carolina, who there assigned
it to the plaintiff. PEARSON, C. J.,
in delivering the opinion of the
Court, said: "While the .note could
not be sued on by the Virginia administrator, yet for all matters in
fiais he had a right to send it to
North Carolina for sale and assignment. In deducing title the letters
of administration granted in Virginia and the assignment though
made in North Carolina bad the
same legal effect as a bill of sale
for a horse, executed in North Carolina, had he sent the horse to North
Carolina and sold it as he did the
note." Lucas v. Bryne (1871), 35
Md., 485, only differed from this last
case in that the administrator in
his fiduciary character transferred
the note to himself in his personal
character in the State where suit
was brought.
It is difficult to sustain the
correctness of the contract principles involved in the last two
cases. The power of an administrator is confined to the jurisdiction
of his appointment, and, therefore,
his contracts in a foreign State as
administrator must lack that quality, since it is impossible to completely dispose of the contract
necessary to transfer the instrument,
in the chattel quality of the instrument. In both these cases the
contract was made in a State foreign
to the qualification. In the latter,
the jurisdiction of the contract is
express. In the former, although
the agency would be governed by
Virginia law, the contract of the
principal through the agent would
be regulated by the law of North
Carolina.
In Rand v. Hubbard, 4 Met., 252,
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several questions were suggested as
making the siUs of the debt that
of the debtor impossible of applica.tion to bills of exchange and promissory notes. It was asked: If
an endorsement can only be made
by an executor or administrator
appointed and authorized in the
State where the debtor dwells, what
is an endorsee to do who holds a
note with a promissor and several
endorsers living in different States?
Must it be endorsed by one administrator so as to give a right of
action against the promissor, and
by another administrator so as to
give a right of action against each
endorser?
The title of an administrator
who has a right of action to a fund
is certainly stronger than the title
of one 'who has no such right.
When the fund is received by the
administrator from the sale of the
note it becomes an asset of the
estate in his jurisdiction. If on
failure of payment by the promissor
the transferee should sue the administrator on his contract of endorsement, the position of the administrator would be the same as if
the other rule were to be applied.
The liability of the other endorsees
to the holder of the note should be
no less; for the administrator,
should they alone be sued, still
holds the fund obtained from the
sale of the note as an asset to be
used in the satisfaction of debts or
the payment of legacies.
Where a note is payable to order
a prospective purchaser would be
charged with notice of its being an
asset of the estate, since the right
to receive payment would appear
in the decedent and the endorsement be made by another person.
But if the note was payable to
bearer, it is clearly possible for a

holder to be entirely without notice
of the personal representative being
in the chain of title, and against
such a holder that circumstance
could not defeat a recovery.
In bills of exchange another contingency is developed.
The bill
may not have been presented. Until acceptance, therefore, it would
be impossible to relegate the situs
of the note to either the jurisdiction
of the drawee or the drawer. The
drawee would be protected in accepting and paying the bill to an administrator appointed in his jurisdiction, and there is no reason to
suppose that the same rule would
not apply, were paymenttobe made
to his endorsee: Att.- Gen. v. Pratt,
L. R., 9 Ex., 140.
According to Yeomans v. Bradshaw, Carth., 373, however, presentment does not have to be made by
the administrator deriving his appointment from the country of the
drawee. And by the same case
suit could only be brought against
the drawer by the administrator
recognized in his jurisdiction.
The drawee of a bill held by a
foreign administrator or his transferee, to protect himself should,
therefore, always decline to accept
the draft, unless the rule obtains
within the country where such presentment is made that, a voluntary
payment to such an administrator
is a good discharge in the absence
of local administration.
While a doctrine of notice as
applied to this question is not
known to have been announced by
any authority, it seems a not impracticable solution.
That there
must be something wrong with the
chattel idea of Story is readily discernible when the effect of a collateral security is considered.
Bonds of governments, bonds and

RIGHT OF ADMINISTRATOR
stocks of corporations and real securities are often given as collateral security for the principal debt
Where the bonds of a government
pass freely from hand to hand without any additional transfer in the
country from which they have been
issued, they are practically money,
and had Att'y-Gen. v. Bouwens, 4
.M.& W., 171, not compared such
instruments to foreign bills of exchange, there seems little doubt
that Westlake (Westlake's Priv.
Int. Law, J 88), would not have
considered 517 Story's "Conft. of
Laws," to be the law of England.
(Foote does not, however, seem to
entertain this view. See Foote's
Int Jus., 2d ed., 282.) Should the
\additional transfer be necessary the
stus of the asset is deemed to be
the sius of the debtor. Atty.-Gen.
v. Dimond, I C. & J., 356; Att.Hope, C., M. & R., 530; 8
Gen. i).
Bligh, 144"
New York conforming to the
principle subsequently expressed in
Peterson v. The Chemical Bank, 32
N.Y., 21, took the opposite view
of the stock of a corporation: Middlebrook v. Merchants' Bank, 27
How. Pr., 474. Throughout the
United States the bonds of the
United States Government have no
particular situs, Vaughan v. Northup, 15 Peters, i; Shakespeare v.
Fidelity Ins.-Co., 97 Pa. St.. 173.
The nature of mortgages depends
on the law of the State where the
land is situated. SroR says ( 424
Conft. of Laws): "The general
principle of the common law is,
that the laws of the place where
immovable property is situated, exclusively govern in respect to the
rights of the parties, the modes of
transfer and the solemnities which
should accompany them. The title,
therefore, to real property can be

acquired, passed and lost only' according to the lex rei sita.
In Cutler v. Davenport, i Pick.
(Mass.), 8I, the question was as to
the effect of an assignment of a
bond and mortgage by a foreign ad-,
ministrator, and it was decided that,
although for certain purposes the
transfer might be considered as an
assignment of a chose in action,
with'collateral security for its payment, yet as the land might eventually be held as an absolute estate
under the mortgage, should it be
foieclosed, the conveyance was necessarily sufficient to transfer the
land. And that in the transfer of
land which is governed by the lex
sit-, the foreign administrator
would not be recognized. (See also
Reynolds v. McMullen, 55 Mich.,
- 568,.where the same principles were
applied, the question being similar, except that statute law distinguished between foreign personal
representatives and those in Michigan although not upon the express
case.)
New Hampshire and New York
have considered mortgages mere
personalty capable of transfer -by a
foreign administrator, and the
Texas case forming the subject of
the annotation takes the same position with regard to the deed of
trust. Gove v. Gove (1886), 64 N.
H., 503; Smith v. Tiffany (1879), x6
Hun. 552, and Solinsky v. Fourth
Nat. Bk., 17 S. W. Rep., io5o.
In Doolittle v. Lewis (1823) 7
John's Ch., 45, an administrator in
Vermont held a bond secured by a
mortgage on lands in New York.
The mortgage contained a power to
the mortgagee, his executors, administrators and assigns in case of
default in payment, to sell and convey the premises according to the
laws of that State. Chancellor
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KtNT held this clause to be a special power given by the mortgagor,
not derived from any court in another State, and authorized its execution in New York by a personal
representative of the mortgagee appointed in Vermont, where the
mortgagee died, saying, the power
and the execution of the power
were a matter of private contract
between the parties and not ofjurisdiction. (See also Averill v. Taylor, 5 How. Pr., 476, and Hayes v.
Frey (1882), 54 Wis. 503, where this
doctrine was adopted.)
Where the instrument representing the principal debt may be transferred but the collateral security is
incapable of transfer except by a
local administrator, a curious question arises as to what right the
transferee has to enforce the principal security. Surely this fact
should not overthrow the theory on
which the contract of a foreign administrator is permitted to invest
his assignee with an enforceable
title to a negotiable security. Nor
should it be capable of the same influence on the chattel idea announced by STORY in 517 Conflict
of Laws. It is significant that the
cases in which the promissory note
had no collateral security were all
founded on the chattel doctrine.
But in those in which a mortgage
existed to secure the debt, the contract rule was adopted. Campbell
v. Brown (1884), 64 Iowa,425; Gove
v. Gove, 64 N. H., 5o3. In Cutter
v. Davenport, I Pick., 8r, the question was before the Court and was
suggested by counsel, but the opinion merely decided against permitting a foreign administrator to
transfer a mortgage on land in
Massachusetts, without noticing
the effect of their action on the
principal obligation which the
57
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mortgage was given to secure. The
contingency seems to have impressed the Supreme Coiurt of South
Carolina in Dial v. Gary, r4 S. C.
573, for in the face of a tendency
on all sides to follow STORY, the
nature of a bond was considered
and an opposite view taken.
In Reynolds v. McMullen, $5
Mich, 568, the tactics of the CoUrt
in Cutter v. Davenport were pursued by all but SHaERWOOD, J., who
attacked the chattel character of a
promissory note as the Court in
South Carolina did the bond. The
question was as to the right of the
administrator of a decedent in
Missouri to assign a note with a
mortgage on land in Michigan,
where the debtor resided, given to
secure it. He said: -The real
question in this case, upon the facts
appearing upon this record, is this:
Were the debts, owing by persons
residing in this State to the deceased, assets to be administered
by the Court in Missouri, or by the
Court in lMichigan? "By the common law debts due by specialty are
esteemed to be the goods of the
deceased where the securities are
at the time of his death; but debts
due by simple contract follow the
person of the debtor, and are regarded as the goods of the deceased
where the debtor resides at the time
of the creditor's death: 3 Bac. Abr.
(Wils. ed. (37-8; Toller's Law of
Executors, 55; "Wms. Saund., 274,
note 3; Speed v. Kelley, 2 Am. Rep.,
553; Wyman v. U. S., 29 Alb. Law
J., 194; Slocum v. Sanford, 2 Conn.,
534- "I am unable to see any good
reason for the distinction made
between debts by specialty and by
simple contracts, or why they
should not all be deemed assets to
be administered at the same place.
The proceeds after the payment of
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debts have all to be distributed according to the law at the domicile
of the deceased; but such is the
law as we find it, and a change'is
for the legislature, and cannot properly be made by this Court. There
can be no question but that the
note was a simple contract debt
and subject to the law applicable
to that kind of claims: Slocum v.
Sanford, sufir; 2 Cooley's BI.
CoM., 51o."
"This Court has
already decided that the debts in
this State due to a person resident
in another State, dying there, can
only be enforced by an executor
or administrator duly appointed
here: Vickery v. Beir, 36 Mich.,
50; Thayer v. Lane, Walk. Ch.,
2oo; and such is the rule at common law: Story's Confl. Law, O
513, 5t4 and cases cited.
The
assignee of these claims, due
from the debtor's in this State,
stands in no other or better position than did the public administrator who made the assignment to
him, aid could confer no rights
which he did not possess: Chapman
v. Fish, 6 Hill, 554; Thompson v.
Wilson, 2 N. H., 29r, and payment to him is no defence to this
suit: Dissoway v. Carroll, 4 Lans.,
19; Vaughn v. Barrett, 5 Vt., 333;
Pond v. Makepeace, 2 Met., 114;
Riley v. Riley, 3 Day, 74; Glenn v.
Smith, 2 Gill & J., 493; McLean v.
Meek, 18 How., 16. The proper
place for administering such assets
must necessarily be where alone
payment can be enforced against
the debtor. I can cometo noother
conclusion upon the facts appearing upon this record. "It necessarily follows that the note and
mortgage were assets to be administered in this State, and that
the public administrator in St.

Louis acquired no right to sell or
dispose of the same in that State
to any person, or any right to the
possession or control of the note
and mortgage, further than to
safely keep them and deliver the
same to the administrator here
required, until after the estate in
Michigan was settled and the debts
there were paid: 2 Kent's Com.,
433, 434; 2 B1.Com., 509; Bac. Abr.
'Executor' R.; Byron v. Byron,
Cro. Eliz., 472; Hilliard v. Cox.,
Ld. Raym, 562; Salk., 37; Whart.
Confl. Laws, 6o4.
* "There is no doubt but that an
executor or administrator may lawfully sell the personal estate of the
deceased, unless prohibited at public or private sale without the order
of the judge of probate, within the
jurisdiction of the Court where
such property is assets in his hands
for administration. He may do so
even at a discount, though the
property sold be notes and mortgages: Burt v. Ricker, 6 Allen, 77;
3 Redf. Wills, 226, 229; 236; and the
purchaser will take a good title
thereto, provided the property was
assets within the control and jurisdiction of the Court where administration was granted. He cannot
make such sale, however, when he
has not the right to enforce collection: Yeomans v. 11radshaw, Carth.,
373; Tourton v. Flower, 3 P. Wins.,
369; Isham v. Gibbons, i Bradf.
Sur., 69; Story on Confl. Laws, a
a
512, 513, 514, 515 , 522, 523; McCarthy v. Hall, 13 MO., 480; Chapman v. Fish, suf-a; Goodwin v.
Jones, 3 Mass., 514; Riley v. Riley;
sufira; SteArns v. Burnham, 5
Greenl., 261; Harrison v. Sterry, 5
Cranch, 289; Dawes v. Head, 3
Pick., 138; Harvey v. Richards, i
Mass., 423; Glenn v. Smith, su,&ra;
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Vaughn v. Barret, suzfra;.Lee v.
Havens, Brayt., 93; Thompson v.
Wilson, 2 N. H., 291; Judy v.
Kelley, II Ill., 211; Willard v.
Hammond, 21 N. H., 382; Smith v.
Guild, 34 Me., 443; Langdon v.
Potter, Ii Mass., 313; Rorer Interstate Law, 248; Speed v. Kelly, 59
Miss., 47; Owen v. Miller, io Ohio
St., r43; Abbott v. Coburn, 28 Vt.,
663; Vaughan v. Northrup, 15 Pet.,
1; Noonan v. Bradley, 9 Wall, 394;
Willitts v. Waite, 25 N. Y., 577;
Valle v. Fleming, 19 Mo., 454."
The greater number of direct decisions must be conceded to agree
with STORY, both as to the rights of
a foreign administrator of bills and
notes, payable to order or bearer,
and to the effect of the contract to
transfer any other negotiable instrument Peterson v. The Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y., 21, shows the
extreme the latter doctrine can be
legitimately carried to. The more
frequent chance for the use of the
former, is as dangerous, as the extreme of the latter.
No case has been found where
the accident of local creditors or
local administrationhas been said
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to alter the rule of liability. On
the contrary, in Peterson v. Chemical Bank, 32 N. Y., 21, the exceptional feature of no local creditors
was considered as not changingthe
principle. The expresw observation in the leading case of the fact
that no domestic claimant for the
fund has been proved on the trial,
seems suggestive of suchr a circumstance being vital in Texas. The
adoption of such a doctrine, however, would embarrass the already
complicated condition of this
branch of the law.
Judgment against one administrator is no evidence of a debt against
another, a parting reason for the
maintainance of the rule, " debts
follow the debtor," in the international law of decedent's estates:
Talmage v. chapel, 16 Mass.; Slanter v. Cherworth, 7 Ind., 211; Taylor v. Barron, 35 N. H., 484; Low
v. Bartlett, 8 Allen, 259; Jones v.
Jones, r5 Tex., 463; Price v. Mace,
47 Wiss., 23; Brodie v. Bickley, 2
Rawle, 231; McLean v. Meek, 18
How., 16; McGarvey v. Darniel, 32
Ill. App., 226.
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